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Whether Kant’s late legal theory and his theory of race are contradic-
tory in their account of colonialism has been a much-debated question
that is also of highest importance for the evaluation of the
Enlightenment’s contribution to Europe’s colonial expansion and the
dispossession and enslavement of native and black peoples. This article
discusses the problem by introducing the discourse on barbarism. This
neglected discourse is the original and traditional European colonial
vocabulary and served the justification of colonialism from ancient
Greece throughout the Renaissance to the eighteenth century. Kant’s
explicit rejection of this discourse and its prejudices reveals his early
critical stance toward colonial judgements of native peoples even
before he developed his legal theory. This development of his critical
position can be traced in his writings on race: although he makes racist
statements in these texts, his theory of race is not meant to ground
moral judgements on ‘races’ or a racial hierarchy but to defend the
unity of mankind under the given empirical reality of colonial
hierarchies.
Keywords: theory of race, racism, colonialism, barbarism, legal
theory, physical geography, natural history, native peoples, anthro-
pophagy, climate theory, travel writings, Georg Forster
1. Introduction
Critics as well as advocates of Kant today agree that his concept of race is
committed to the existence of a ‘racial hierarchy’ and hence itself racist.
In defence of Kant, Pauline Kleingeld has made a powerful case for
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limiting this diagnosis to Kant’s early work and his writings on race dur-
ing his middle period. Under the assumption that Kant ‘radically changed
his view on colonialism’ (Kleingeld : ), Kleingeld contrasts his
early colonial racism with Kant’s later, non-racist anti-colonialism. In
her reading of Kant’s ‘second thoughts on race’ (Kleingeld ), the con-
cept of race became increasingly ‘less prominent’ in Kant’s writing until it
ultimately ‘no longer fitted’ the anti-colonial theory of right he developed
in Perpetual Peace () and The Metaphysics of Morals ()
(Kleingeld : , ).
Robert Bernasconi (: ) has countered that Kant had ‘third
thoughts on race’ when he published further editions of his articles on
race after  (, , ) and made reference in his
Anthropology () to Christoph Girtanner’s Concerning the
Kantian Principle inNaturalHistory (), which followedKant’s ideas
on race. Unless one wants to assume that Kant advocated two mutually
exclusive positions at the same time, this suggests the possibility of con-
sistency between Kant’s concept of race and his anti-colonialism, as well
as the need to reconsider the seemingly fixed interpretation of the former
as a racial hierarchy.
To understand colonialism as a consequence of the hierarchical thinking
of the Enlightenment is to lose the point of enlightened anti-colonialism.
HowardWilliams (: ) argues that it is precisely the anti-colonial
position that is obscured in today’s readings of Kant: informed by the
discussion of race, it ends up in the paradoxical position of proving
the irrelevance of Kant’s arguments against colonialism despite its own
anti-colonial interests. When today’s readers find patterns of racist thought
in historical texts, it shows, at the first instance, only how we think about
racism today, because that determines what we seek and find in historical
texts. The views and partial theories of Kant, especially his theory of ‘races’,
need to be reconstructed in their historical context. The context of Kant’s
texts on race is marked by the colonial discourse on barbarism and bio-
social climate theory.Given the lack of explanation for a radical and sudden
change of opinion in Kant’s old age, it makes sense to start from the
assumption of consistency between Kant’s positions. It is then possible
to trace a sceptical position that Kant began developing much earlier in
the view he takes on the colonial ‘barbarism discourse’.
Kant’s engagement with the colonial discourse on barbarism has been
almost entirely overlooked in the debate so far. The concept of the ‘bar-
barian’ precedes the one of race and served as a carrier of European
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colonialism for millennia. It had shaped Europe’s idea of the ‘Other’
since antiquity. Especially Aristotle’s description of ‘natural slaves’ in
Book  of his Politics prepared their colonialization and enslavement.
Considering the concept of barbarism allows for an approach that avoids
the methodological problem, common in the discussion of race, of con-
flating the two discourses as well as the two concomitant types of degra-
dation. While ‘race’ is said to establish a hierarchy between different
‘races’, ‘barbarism’ establishes a dichotomy: what is in question for a
‘barbarian’ is not his or her position in an assumed hierarchy but whether
he or she can count as a human at all.
This article proceeds in four steps. First, I discuss methodological reasons
for taking Kant’s dealingwith the notion ‘barbarism’ into account. Then I
present Kant’s use of the term ‘barbarian’. The decisive characteristic here
is his reversal of the direction of critique: it is no longer the Other who is
degraded as ‘barbaric’ but rather the European states that are described
as ‘barbarian’ warmongers. In section , I analyse three stages of Kant’s
concept of race and show that he developed a non-hierarchical concept of
race in his middle period (). The process of self-enlightenment that
Kant undergoes in his work on the discourse on barbarism finds its ana-
logue in his concept of race and is most obvious after he started to think
about a cosmopolitan legal order in . This background is necessary
to elucidate the explanatory function of Kant’s thought on ‘race’. Finally,
I show through an analysis of Kant’s debate with Georg Forster that his
defence of themonogenetic approach also defends the unity of the human
species in an attack on colonialism.
2. Barbarism, Anti-Colonialism and Kant’s Racism
A common view today identifies not the hierarchy of races, but a dichoto-
mous form of distinction as the main feature of racism: ‘The category of
race is only one reference point of racism, which has appeared in different
historical shapes and has drawn upon several dichotomies, constructing
monsters, barbarians, inferiors, the impure, the cursed, savages and even-
tually coloureds’ (Hund : ). The issue, then, would be cultural
degradation and general stereotypes. This view, however, risks losing
sight of the differences between the two discourses on race and barba-
rism. Even though Kant established the concept of race as a philosophical
concept (cf. Bernasconi : –), it should nonetheless be distin-
guished carefully from the discourse on barbarism.Otherwise, the char-
acteristic feature of the barbarism discourse, that is, the dichotomy of two
poles, the ‘barbarian’ and the ‘civilized man’, is mistakenly taken to
describe the discourse on race, despite the fact the latter functions on
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an entirely different basis in order to create a hierarchical – and not
dichotomous – order of races. I aim to show that Kant’s rejection of
the barbarism discourse served to criticize colonial prejudices and
enabled him to develop his concept of race in this context. Only in dis-
tinguishing between the two discourses does a contextualized look at
Kant’s concept of race become possible and reveal its specific content.
It will then also become clear that his concept of race and his anti-
colonialism can be understood as perfectly consistent. Inés Valdez also
argues for consistency, rather than proclaiming a sudden change of heart.
She attempts to find consistency in ‘Kant’s anti-colonialism and his hier-
archical understanding of the world’, expressed by his race theory
(Valdez : ). Valdez shows convincingly that Kant connected
the colonial wars and cruelties to Europe’s future and faith. Therefore,
she describes Kant’s anti-colonialism as ‘Eurocentric’ and ‘partly moti-
vated by a concern’ about the effects of colonialism on European peace
and republicanism (). She also convincingly describes Kant’s account
of the differences of races as a ‘relative weakness’ and argues that Kant
aimed to protect non-Europeans by cosmopolitan law (). Only her
conclusion, that ‘These protections do not imply a retreat from racial
and civilizational hierarchies’ (), appears in the light of the barbarism
discourse less convincing because, as I will show, Kant attempts to defend
the unity of humanity in the writings on race and not the hierarchy of
races. So even if Kant’s anti-colonialism may be partly Eurocentric, his
concern for wrong judgements about non-European peoples comes to
the fore in his rejection of the discourse on barbarism, the classical
European colonial discourse.
Consequently, we need to change perspective. Rather than look for the
confirmation of racism in the concept of race, we should investigate it
for signs of anti-colonialism. If the concept of race showed no signs of
anti-colonialism, we would have to posit a continuity of degradation
of other peoples, and understand the anti-colonialism in Kant’s legal
theory as an exception and a pure Eurocentric view. Conversely, if we
take Kant’s anti-colonialism seriously and understand his concept of race
in opposition to the concept of the barbarian, aspects of his race theory
appear as an analogue to the anti-colonial aspects of his legal theory.
Once such a consistency between Kant’s concept of race and his later anti-
colonial writings has been established, it allows us to return to an inves-
tigation of the causes for Kant’s change of mind that Pauline Kleingeld
has argued for. These causes are anchored in the different perspectives
offered by legal theory and the concept of race on the same two
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phenomena, that is, the differing characteristics among the human species
and colonial hierarchies as they actually existed. The concept of race is
deeply connected to Kant’s critical philosophy and part of his attempts
to deal with natural history. The theory of race is, as Stella Sandford
states, ‘the context in which the general problem of a natural system
of nature and of the systematic unity of nature, beyond the aggregate
of empirical knowledge, is first und fully addressed by Kant’ (Sandford
: ). It follows from this that the description of the phenomenon
of colonialism from within a concept of race is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with the condemnation of colonialism in Kant’s legal theory. When
the concepts of race and right are seen as different perspectives on
the development of the human species and its current condition,
Kant’s concept of race and his anti-colonialism can be seen as comple-
mentary parts of a complex explanation rather than as a puzzling incon-
sistency (Kleingeld : ).
It is precisely in this sense that Kleingeld’s thesis can be confirmed in
modified form. In brief, Kant gradually progressed from a popular,
Hume-inspired sentiment of superiority () to climate-theoretical
race theory () and a value-neutral concept of race (), to a
teleological concept of race () that allowed him to then condemn
colonialism (, ) while adhering to his concept of race ().
He was able to do so because his writings on race are not intended to
justify Europe’s colonial expansion but to explain its success and founda-
tions in the perspective of the natural development of the human species.
It is systemically impossible to condemn colonialism within a framework
of race because here humans and their development are understood as
part of the animal kingdom. It is possible, however, to describe the
existing colonial hierarchy of races on this basis. Condemnation, on
the other hand, becomes possible only with a concept of right that can
determine the legitimacy of relations of power and suppression. If
Kant’s racial theory lacks a condemnation of colonialism, this lack does
not necessarily signal acceptance or confirmation of colonialism. On the
contrary, the coincidence of his first article regarding the idea of a cosmo-
politan view on history in  and his most value-neutral assessment of
the question of human races in  can be understood as the combina-
tion of two perspectives on the problem of war and colonialism: that of
the evolution of law and that of the biological history of humankind.
Kant does indeed identify racial characteristics as reasons for varying
degrees of technological and social differentiation, leading to
European dominance, but he explains them as the results of unavoidable,
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prehistorical adaptation to climatic conditions. In the case of extremely
hot climates, Kant posits the inevitable adoption of ‘indolence’
(Trägheit), and ‘indolent’ societies are therefore unable to develop
‘European’ vitality and remain in a nomadic or pre-state stage, rendering
them largely defenceless objects of European colonialism.
3. Kant’s Transformation of the Colonial Concept of ‘Barbarian’
into a Concept for Criticism of European States
Kant reverses the colonial discourse on barbarism into a concept that can
serve to criticize European states on the basis of his critical reception of
the reports on other peoples that had been collected in the process of
European expansion. This critical turn is an important feature of the
European anti-colonial tradition from Las Casas and Montaigne to
Rousseau and French enlightenment thinkers like Diderot (Fink-Eitel
, Eberl ). Kant clearly proves his commitment to these prede-
cessors by dealing with colonial judgements. Kant’s engagement with
popular travel reports provides the key to explaining the change from
an obviously uncritical feeling of superiority in  to a value-neutral
concept of race in . Where Kant first uncritically trusted and
accepted the description of and judgements on foreign peoples in those
travel reports (), he ultimately became so critical of them () that
Georg Forster as a representative of the (new) travel writers understood
Kant’s critique as a personal attack and initiated a debate.
While it is true that, in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s words, Kant’s ‘reli-
ance on explorers, missionaries, seekers after wealth and fame, coloniz-
ers. etc. and their travelogues provided or served to validate Kant’s worst
characterization of non-Europeans “races” and cultures’, it is nonetheless
mistaken to claim that ‘Kant believed that travel stories provided accurate
or factual information for academic science’ (Eze : , –).
Similarly, Thomas McCarthy holds that Kant ‘warned repeatedly of
the unreliability of such sources, but rely on them he did. As a result
: : : he largely repeated the racist commonplaces of the period. And in
his account these commonplaces were naturalized through being biolo-
gized’ (McCarthy : ). While McCarthy identifies old prejudices
as the theoretical foundation of Kant’s concept of race, Eze seeks to prove
that Kant provided a new justification of racial superiority. Kant’s doubts
and warnings concerning the travel reports disappear from view in both
Eze and McCarthy because both writers remain focused on the issue of
‘racial differentiation’. In contrast, an investigationwithin the framework
of the barbarism discourse shows that Kant criticizes old prejudices.
OLIVER EBERL
390 KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 24 – 3
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415419000189
subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB Hannover), on 20 Dec 2021 at 17:15:42,
A crucial source of Kant’s engagement with the barbarism discourse is his
detailed description of colonial possessions and conditions in his lectures
on Physical Geography. Kant presented these lectures annually, from
 until the end of his teaching career in . The published version
was by no means written by Kant (cf. Stark ) and contains state-
ments from all periods of the development of this theory: climate theory,
the skin and its colour, as well as elements that became less important
over time and on which Kant changed his position. As an example, con-
sider the passage on the development of skin colour. On one and the same
page, it claims that skin colour results from exposure to heat, and that it
results from nutrition, exposure to air and from education (PG, : ).
These claims directly contradict one another, and Kant ultimately main-
tained only the former. The drastic formulations in his lectures are often
read as a confirmation of Kant’s racism, but are indeed only conven-
tional judgements from travel reports from a time when Kant accepted
their claims largely uncritically. They correspond roughly to those prej-
udices in Kant’s early Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and
Sublime (). Importantly, they are not only uncritical but also were
articulated before Kant developed his concept of race.
Eventually, Kant published his essay on the ‘races of human beings’ in
, including a description of a hierarchy of races. His choice of words
there comes very close to a particular passage in the Physical Geography:
In the torrid zones, humans mature more quickly in all aspects
than in the temperate zones, but they fail to reach the same
[degree of] perfection. Humanity has its highest degree of perfec-
tion in the white race. The yellow Indians have a somewhat lesser
talent. The Negroes are much lower, and lowest of all is part of
the American races. (PG, : )
Werner Stark has shown that Kant’s original first manuscript dates from
the years  to , and that this passage originated around  and
was further embellished by Kant’s publisher Rink and the students taking
notes (Stark ). It is possible, then, that ‘perfection’ (Vollkommenheit)
here refers to the adaptation to natural conditions in the sense of the
climate-theoretical assumptions of Kant’s essay on human races from
. This position grows gradually less important in both Kant’s lectures
and his writings on race theory.
In his announcement of the lecture in , Kant writes that he plans to
proceed ‘with the reasoned curiosity of a traveller who everywhere looks
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for the noteworthy, the strange, and the beautiful, compares the obser-
vations he has collected, and revises his ideas accordingly’ (APG, : ).
He provides a detailed list of travel reports that represent the scientific
knowledge of the time. It is this idea of capturing the natural worldwith
a method that focuses on the ‘noteworthy’ (merkwürdige) and incorpo-
rates it into a ‘system’ that Kant increasingly comes to doubt over time.
At the same time, Linné incorporated pejorative descriptions on different
human species in his Systema Naturae in , which matches the
preparations for Kant’s first lecture.
Kant’s rejection of this pejorative reasoning and the credibility of the
travel reports is particularly obvious in his treatment of cannibalism.
Anthropophagy was an essential topos of the barbarism discourse and
played an important part in describing the native population of South
America. Along with human sacrifice, anthropophagy functioned as
proof of godlessness and as a foundation for legitimizing a ‘just war’
against ‘barbarians’ (Pagden ). Of the inhabitants of the islands
of Nicobar and Andaman, Kant writes: ‘They are falsely accused of being
cannibals. In general, the most reliable travellers, Dampier among them,
have found this cruel custom, which has been ascribed to many unknown
peoples, to be untrue’ (PG, : ). Perhaps Kant’s note that the inhab-
itants are also ‘tall andwell-proportioned’ helps explainwhy he rushed to
defend their reputation. More importantly, the passage refers to the
sensationalized reports of irrational travellers, of whom there appear
to bemany. Kant bluntly rejects the genre of horror stories, which usually
allege cannibalism, and it is likely that in the course of this revision he also
came to reject the other extreme, the image of the ‘noble savage’, which he
had still adopted in hisObservations. It is clear to Kant that ‘the giants in
Patagonia are figments of the imagination. : : : The people described by
Pliny, with one eye, hunch backs, one foot, without a mouth, races of
dwarfs, and so on, also belong in this category’ (PG, : ).
And yet, there are other passages. Concerning some peoples, Kant appa-
rently accepts the reports of cannibalism.On the Anzikos, Kant notes that
‘according to missionary reports, human flesh from fat slaves, properly
butchered for the purpose, is on sale on their markets’ (PG, : ). In
South America, the Tapeje are reported to ‘devour captured enemies’.
A passage further down shows that this is not a thoroughly composed
and consistent manuscript: ‘A prisoner taken in battle is cared for very
well at first, is even given a woman to sleep with, but afterwards he is
killed and eaten, without, however, being tortured. All strangers are well
received. The humming bird is said to sing very beautifully here, which it
OLIVER EBERL
392 KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 24 – 3
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415419000189
subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB Hannover), on 20 Dec 2021 at 17:15:42,
does not do in North America’ (). The way these three pieces of infor-
mation are bundled together suggests either that Kant did not present
them in this way or, even if he did, that they are older passages put
together almost arbitrarily.
The same holds for a statement on Paraguay that reads as if taken straight
out of the classic barbarism discourse: ‘The savages of this country are
dangerous cannibals’ (PG, : ). The same paragraph mentions a
 study of the coast south of Buenos Aires, suggesting that the passage
dates from the early iterations of Kant’s lecture in the  s or  s.
Another passage alleging that ‘Eskimos’ ate their wives and children
when running short of food during their travels refers to a report by
Captain Ellis dating from  (). The Indians of North America,
on the other hand, are said to either adopt prisoners of war into their
own families in time, or torture, cook and eat them. Kant also provides
an explanation for this behaviour: ‘This occurs more from the desire to
appease the spirit of theman killed bymeans of a vengeance sacrifice than
from appetite’ ().
Kant’s choice of words suggests a gradual development of his judgement,
moving from the uncritical citing of reports as facts (‘are’) to careful
distancing (‘it is reported’, wird berichtet), attempts at explanation
(‘appease’) and, finally, strong and general scepticism and disbelief
(‘falsely accused [of] this cruel custom’, angedichtete Grausamkeit).
The development of Kant’s judgement could only have occurred in this
direction of self-enlightenment: the reference to travellers who doubted
the veracity of tales of cannibalism must have been added later than
the cited travel reports because the opposite case – general rejection of
those tales first, uncritical reference later – would be self-contradictory
and require further explanation to the lecture’s audience. It can therefore
be assumed that the passages typical of the barbarism discourse
came first. Later, Kant develops an ironic use of cannibalism when he
compares the European way of treating defeated enemies with that of
the cannibalistic ‘savages’ and comes to the result that the Europeans
would ‘know how to make better use’ of them for ‘even more extensive
wars’ (PP, : ).
Kant did not stop at criticizing those untrustworthy reports. He system-
atically transformed a classical concept used for degrading other peoples
and cultures into a concept used to criticize European states. The moral
judgements that were part of the barbarism discourse – bellicose brutish-
ness, intellectual limitation – are well known to Kant, who speaks in
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Perpetual Peace of the ‘barbarous, crude, and brutishly degrading
to humanity, the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom’
(PP, : ). That Kant was very well aware of the conventional use of
the designation ‘barbaric’ for colonialized peoples and the misuse of the
concept of hospitality can be seen in this passage: ‘The principle of the
supposed justice of acquiring newly discovered lands, taken for barbaric
or unbelieving, as ownerless goods without the authorization of the inhab-
itants and even by subjugating them, are every one absolutely contrary to
cosmopolitan rights limited to mere hospitality’ (DR, : ). He turned
themagainst the Europeans by using the term ‘barbaric’ to describe thewar-
ring behaviour of European states in his legal philosophy. In his ‘Idea for a
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent’ (), Kant writes:
This the barbaric freedom of already established states also does,
namely, that through the application of all powers of the
commonwealth to armaments against one another, through
the devastations perpetrated by war, even more, however,
through the necessity of preserving themselves constantly in
readiness for it, the full development of the natural predisposi-
tions are restrained in their progress. (IUH, : )
In the Critique of Judgement (), Kant refers to the ‘barbarism of
wars’ (CJ, : ); in Perpetual Peace (), he condemns the ‘barbaric
means of war’ (PP, : ); and in theMetaphysics of Morals (), he
demands that nations ‘[decide] their disputes in a civil way, as if by a
lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way (the way of savages), namely by
war’ (MM, : ). In his reflections on anthropology, finally, Kant notes
that ‘there is still something barbaric about states, in that they are unwill-
ing to submit to the force of law in regards to their neighbours’ and ‘in
terms of international law, we still are barbarians’ (RA, : , ;
translation mine). Even the legislation of criminal law can be ‘barbarous
and undeveloped’ (MM, : ).
Taken together, Kant’s arguments proceed on two levels: on the one
hand, he incorporates the European discovery of a variety of foreign
peoples into his Physical Geography, with the intent of accurately repre-
senting the contemporary knowledge of the world that includes coloni-
alism; on the other, he develops an agenda against the consequences of
these discoveries in his later writings on legal theory, where he condemns
colonialism, sketches a system of juridification that would constrain
colonialism, and turns the pejorative concept of barbarism against the
European states.
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Kant’s search for the foundational causes for the success of European
expansion and the underlying superiority of European economies, tech-
nology, weapons, as well as state and social institutions and personality
traits such as discipline and will power, leads him to race theory. The
essential function of race theory is to explain unity in a world of
differences – not, as is often assumed – the differences in a unified world.
‘Race’ is the ‘view of a mere describer of nature whose interest is unity’
(Sandford : ) and ‘not an empirical category for determining
judgement’ (). The world creates differences itself and it does not take
a philosopher to point them out; the world needs a philosopher to at least
allege unity against the reality of difference.Kant’s description of racial
characteristics, therefore, has as its starting point those differences that
made history possible as it occurred: expansionary Europeans meet
unprepared peoples and nations (with the exceptions of China and
Japan). The causes for the advantages and disadvantages of both
European and non-European peoples at the time of interaction are
explained through race theory, but this theory is not the place for either
condemnation or overcoming of actual, given conditions. Those can be
found only in the later Kant’s legal theory.
4. The Development of Kant’s Concept of Race
The prejudices of the travel reports are the prejudices of the barbarism
discourse. Since Kant developed a critical stance towards them, it is rea-
sonable to investigate whether his race theory really converts the preju-
dices of the barbarism discourse into a biological-natural history, based
on units he identifies as ‘races’ in order to explain and justify colonialism.
This endeavour requires consideration of the specific meaning of the
concept of race. If, as Bernasconi puts it, ‘racism is always shifting its
character’ (: ), then anti-racism and anti-colonialism also need
to shift their characters. It follows that we have to paymuchmore serious
attention to the fact that it was Kant’s primary goal to refute the theory of
polygenism, that is, the assumption that human beings descend from dif-
ferent tribes or races (). One could think of race as an idea that
allowed philosophers to combine considerations of common origin
and hereditary difference (Hund : ). It is just that point of
common origin that has so far been direly neglected vis-à-vis the
issue of difference. I am going to discuss this aspect by way of analysing
Kant’s writings on race, in order to show that his attempt to determine the
characteristics of given ‘races’ as a combination of unity and difference
mirrors his critique of the barbarism discourse and can explain the causes
of the differences between societies and thus the success of colonialism.
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The gradual change of heart visible in Kant’s lectures on physical geog-
raphy can also be found in his writings on race. His contributions there
had to engage with the discussion of the Gestalt of the human species.
Aside from the biological theories of Karl von Linné () and
Johann Blumenbach (), the main source for the debate over unity
and difference in the human species was a climate theory that dated back
to antiquity and was popularized by Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the
Laws (). This theory made it possible to at least attempt an explan-
ation of the obvious differences in skin colour or hair texture as adapta-
tions to the environment, leaving open the question of how long those
adaptations (such as skin colour) would last. Since its early days in
ancient ethnography, climate theory had also been connected to the
theory of ‘extremes’: it identified in the North the deprived life of hunters
in extreme cold, in the heat of the South a life of laziness and comfort, and
only in the middle the possibility for a balance of climate and character.
This theory explains the particular interest in the eighteenth century for
both the then-called ‘Eskimos’ and ‘Lapps’ in the furthest North and the
‘Hottentots’ in the south of Africa. Only the middle region of temperate
climate seemed to allow the development of higher civilizations, and this
self-certitude typifies European Eurocentrism in the mid-eighteenth
century.
Monogenists like Buffon were confronted with the problem of explaining
how the original human population could have developed into groups of
different skin colour. A competing answer was given by polygenism, the
thesis of human origins in different tribes (Sandford : ff.,
Jablonski : ). Kant’s chain of argument clearly suggests a devel-
opment from the uncritical acceptance of general stereotypes and preju-
dices toward a more critical position.
In , Kant published hisObservations on the Feeling of the Beautiful
and Sublime, a text full of facile observations on how different character
types, men and women, different European nations, and finally non-
European peoples, relate to questions of beauty. The descriptions of
Canadian Indians and Africans stand out in this essay. For the African
population, Kant shows only disdain: ‘The Negroes of Africa have by
nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous’, and their feeling of
beauty hence remains unconnected to what is noble (OBS, : ). To
support his thesis, Kant refers to the claim David Humemade in his essay
on ‘National Character’ () (Hume n.d.: ), that no ‘black man’
had ever made significant contributions to the arts or sciences, even when
he had acquired freedom in Europe (OBS, : ). Kant should have
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known this claim to be false, even by his own definitions: the example of
Anton Wilhelm Amo, who had come from Africa, had studied at the
universities of Halle, Wittenberg and Jena, and had ultimately become
an Enlightenment thinker in his own right and been recognized as such
by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and others (cf. Ette : ), was
enough to debunk Hume’s theory there and then. Kant simply ignored
it, and his uncompromising judgements on Africa’s black population
stands in contrast to his empathetic judgement on the Canadian
Indians, whom he may have been familiar with from de Lahontan’s
reports (see Lahontan , ): ‘Among all the savages there is no
people which demonstrates such a sublime character of mind as that
of North America’ (OBS, : ). His description of native Canadians
is reminiscent of Rousseau’s picture of the ‘noble savage’. Kant sharply
distinguished between these noble Canadian Indians and all others.
Keeping with the tradition, he presents a dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘evil’
savages without being able to explain the difference or developing any
serious interest in it. This uncritical approach can be seen in the judge-
ments he simply accepts, and which ultimately take him to the picture
of the ‘noble savage’ he will later strongly refute in his writings on the
philosophy of history.
In an early version of an infamous footnote, Hume had suspected
‘the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four
or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites’ (see Garrett
: ). Hume, however, had developed this view explicitly in
opposition toMontesquieu’s climate theory, due to the theory’s problems
in accounting for similarities and differences within and across different
sets of climatic conditions. In contrast, Hume favours ‘moral causes’,
understood primarily as political institutions or forms of government,
over ‘physical’ ones such as ‘air and climate’ in explaining differences
(Hume n.d.: ).
Kant rejects this line of reasoning and defends climate theory on a higher
level than that of political institutions, namely that of what he calls
‘races’. He, too, postulates that there are four races, designated by skin
colour. The impact of climate on the development of ‘races’ which all
descend from a common origin is the subject of the race theory that
Kant eventually develops. His ‘Plan and Announcement of a Series of
Lectures on Physical Geography’ () does not yet mention races
(APG, : –). This suggests that he felt inspired to introduce the term
by Hume (and by the French discourse, Voltaire among others), even
though he rejects both Hume’s (and Voltaire’s) polygenetic approach
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and his method of observing ‘political’ institutions as a way of proving
the difference between ‘races’ (which, on a side note, remains within
the tradition of the barbarism discourse) in favour of one that ‘merely
considers the natural characteristics of the globe and what is on it’ ().
In , Kant published his essay ‘Of the Different Races of Human
Beings’, referring directly to climate theory and accepting its idea of
the development of extremes or polar opposites. From the beginning,
Kant refers to Buffon’s rule according towhich all animals which produce
fertile young with one another belong to one and the same species (ODR,
: ). From this, he concludes the common origin of all ‘races’. In other
words, Kant begins his first attempt at defining a concept of humankind
by searching for the cause of its common origin, not the differences within
it. The ‘hereditary differences of the animals : : : which persistently
preserve themselves : : : over prolonged generations’ determine their
‘race’, and Kant hence uses the terms also for humans who are seen here
as part of the animal kingdom. After this brief introduction, Kant turns to
the much-discussed issue of classifying the ‘black’ peoples and stresses his
monogenetic conviction: ‘In this way, Negroes and whites, while not
different kinds of human beings (since they belong presumably to one
phylum), are still two different races because each of the two perpetuates
itself in all regions’ (). Blondes and brunettes are ‘strains’ (Spielarten)
within the ‘white race’, whereas hereditary differences within one ‘race’
are termed ‘varieties’ (Varietäten). This distinction is followed by a divi-
sion of humankind into four ‘races’: ‘the race of the whites’, ‘the Negro
race’, ‘the Hunnish (Mongolian or Kalmuckian) race’ and ‘the Hindu or
Hindustani race’ ().
Kant identifies ‘natural predispositions’, or ‘germs’ (Keime) as the cause
for the development of these ‘races’ (ODR, : ). In line with the
assumptions of climate theory, he argues that air and sun, but not nutri-
tion, ‘produce an enduring development of the germs and dispositions,
i.e., are able to establish a race’ (). In the ‘glacial zone’, for instance,
human beings develop small stature, reduced hair growth, protection of
the eyes and the red-brown skin-colour of the ‘Kalmuckian race’ (ibid.).
After an interlude of casual remarks on the character of native Americans
and their ‘half extinguished life power’ which qualifies them only for
slave labour in the house while African slaves are needed for labour in
the fields (), Kant continues his elaboration of the climate theory
problem of opposites. Notably, there is no longer any trace of his positive
evaluations of native Canadians in hisObservations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and Sublime.
OL IVER EBERL
398 KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 24 – 3
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415419000189
subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB Hannover), on 20 Dec 2021 at 17:15:42,
In ‘the greatest humid heat of the warm climate’, ‘[t]he exact opposite of
the Kalmuckian formation will be produced’. Nose and lips have to
become ‘thick’, and skin has to become ‘oiled’ to protect against evapo-
ration and ‘putrefactive humid elements of the air’. The evaporation of
‘phosphorous acid’ is theorized to create a distinctive ‘stink’ and black
skin colour. In extreme heat, humans develop characteristics understood
as adaptation: ‘this results in the Negro, who is well suited to his climate,
namely strong, fleshy, supple, but who, given the abundant provision of
his mother land, is lazy, soft and trifling’ (ODR, : ). Kant contrasts
his theory of race as germs adapting to climate and then developing into
four phenotypes with ‘other conjectures which find the differences in the
human species so incompatible that they rather assume on that account
many local creations’ (). He names Voltaire as a representative of the
latter school.
Kant now turns to the question of the original species (Stammgattung),
which either must have died out ormust approximate one of the currently
existing races. His answer refers back to classic climate theory and its
assumption of the superiority of the mean – which can be found only
in the ‘ancient world’, whose white inhabitants must have been closest
to the ‘original formation’ (ODR, : –).
Kant is well aware that this does not yet answer the crucial climate theory
question of why ‘similar countries and regions still do not contain the
same race’ (ODR, : ). He asks why America, also characterized
by heat and humidity, is not inhabited by a ‘black’ race, and concludes
that germs can no longer be altered once developed into a race ().
Kant has to come to this conclusion or be willing to give up on
Buffon’s general rule. His negative evaluation of races follows the logic
of climate theory: geographically extreme regions give rise to the develop-
ment of polar types of humanity, in the South as well as in the North.
‘Black’ populations are ‘lazy’ because of climate and abundance,
suggesting a type of adaptation inevitable for biological beings. There
is no explanation for the ‘half extinguished life power’ found in
Americans, but Kant cautiously suggests a connection to their quick
expansion into the South. Similarly, there is no explanation for Kant’s
negative evaluations of Africans. These evaluations stem from climate
theory and common prejudices of the time. The different races’ lines of
descent are not an elaborate hierarchy: the process of descent belongs
to the field of natural history, whereas any hierarchy would be found
in the field of observation.
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Following his climate-theoretic treatment of race in , Kant publishes
another essay on race, ‘Determination of the Concept of a Human Race’,
in . He now begins his discussion from a position of explicit scep-
ticism concerning the existing knowledge of foreign peoples. From the
very beginning, Kant asserts that the knowledge of the ‘manifoldnesses
in the human species’ produced by the ‘new travels’ has ‘contributedmore
to exciting the understanding to investigation on this point than to sat-
isfying it. It is of great consequence to have previously determined the
concept one wants to elucidate through observation before questioning
experience about it’ (DCR, : ). This methodological innovation is a
response to the dubious state of contemporary knowledge. The intent
remains to prove the unity of the human species. Kant wants to restrict
his discussion to the most fundamental issues and argues that the only
hereditary difference among the human species is skin colour. In his
schema, there are four types: ‘whites’, ‘yellow Indians’, ‘Negroes’ and
‘copper-red Americans’ ().
There is no mention of ‘laziness’ or ‘slackness’ in this essay, nor a racial
hierarchy of descent or other evaluations. Kant reiterates his assumption
of the inevitable heredity of skin colour and insists that ‘those four
differences in color are the only ones among all hereditary characters that
are unfailingly hereditary’ (DCR, : ). They are ingrained in the ‘germs’
of the ‘original phylum’ and ensure the suitability of human beings to dif-
ferent regions.Once againKant rejects the assumption of different species
of human beings and stresses the feature of commonality that is contained
in his concept of race: ‘Thus the concept of a race contains first the con-
cept of a common phylum, second necessarily hereditary characters of the
classificatory difference among the latter’s descendants’ ().
This differentiation allows Kant to retain the unity of the human species.
It suggests that the difference is ‘only’ on the level of races, that is, at a
lower level than that of the species. The supremacy of the white ‘race’
is thus rejected: ‘The class of the whites is not distinguished from that
of the blacks as a special kind within the human species, and there are
no different kinds of human beings’ (DCR, : –).
Once a skin colour has developed, it remains constant for each race, and
the white race has adapted to climatic conditions just as much as all
others. Kant thus gives up on his ordering of races, as well as on the ques-
tion of the ‘original race’: ‘It is therefore impossible to guess the shape of
the first human phylum (as far as the constitution of the skin is con-
cerned); even the character of the whites is only the development of
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one of the original predispositions that together with the others were to
be found in that phylum’ (DCR, : ). Given that the white race, too,
has developed its characteristics from the original ‘germ’, it cannot have
been the original race. In this essay, Kant presents amuch thinner concept
of race: he carefully leaves out, and at times even corrects, the prejudices
of the earlier text while retaining his case for the unity of the species. This
is an essay on race free of racial hierarchies – in other words, a case of
non-racist race theory. This theory is the clearest expression of a new
definition of the concept of race, inspired by Kant’s doubts concerning
the veracity of the prejudices against the ‘barbarians’.
5. Race and History: Kant’s Debate with Herder and Georg Forster
His new definition of the concept of race leads Kant straight into a debate
with Georg Forster, provoked in part by Kant’s  review of Johann
Gottfried Herder’s Outline of a Philosophical History of Humanity, the
second part of which had been published in the same year. As Herder’s
text was a response to Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History’ (), Kant
responded with his ‘Conjectural Beginning of Human History’ () to
the first volume ofHerder’s Philosophical History, among others. Herder
had opened that volume with descriptions of different peoples, reasoning
that ‘these varieties are already noticed in elementary treatises on natural
history’ (Herder : ). These ‘elementary treatises’, however, rely
exactly on the kind of descriptions that Herder does not consider particu-
larly trustworthy –with the exception of the newest reports from Cook’s
voyage, provided by Georg Forster and his father Reinhold Forster.
Kant’s review takes up Herder’s ‘wish for a collection of new portrayals
of nations’ (RH, : ) and acknowledges the problem of ‘the immeas-
urable multiplicity of ethnographic descriptions or travel narratives
and all their conjectural records belonging to human nature, especially
those inwhich they contradict one another’ (–). Analysing them yields
arbitrary results:
One can prove, if one wants to, that Americans, Tibetans, and
other genuine Mongolian peoples have no beard, but also, if it
suits you better, that all of them are by nature bearded and only
pluck them out; that Americans and Negroes are each a race,
sunk beneath the remaining members of the human species in
their mental presuppositions, but on the other side by just as
apparent records that as regards their natural predispositions, they
are to be estimated equal to every other inhabitant of the world; so
it remains to the choice of the philosopher whether he wants to
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assume differences of nature or wants to judge everything in accor-
dance the principle tout comme chez nous. (RH, : )
What those reports cannot provide is the sound foundation for a system
(RH, : ). Kant responds by suggesting that one speak of different
races, distinguished by skin colour. In contrast, Herder prefers to speak
of cultural differences in response to climatic conditions.
Kant andHerder are soon joined byGeorg Forster in their debate over the
dubious veracity of observations of nature. Forster understands Kant’s
statements as an attack not only on his vocation as traveller and author
but also on his particular style of writing in a ‘philosophical’ rather than
merely sober-factual manner. To him, his travel reports amounted to a
form of ‘literary sympathy’, derived from personal experiences with
foreign peoples (cf. Peitsch : ). Forster distinguishes his travel
reports from an older variant dating back to the colonial travels of
Spanish explorers and considers his innovation as an elevation of scien-
tific standards (Forster : ). On the one hand, then, these reports
represent a new type of travel report. On the other, it is easy to imagine
howKantmay have felt provoked byHerder’s claim to write ‘philosophi-
cal history’ while rejecting the idea of a ‘system’. Kant had already
reprimanded Herder for his ‘poetical spirit’, taking ‘allegories for truth’,
and for ‘the fabric of bold metaphors, poetic images, mythological allu-
sions’ (RH, : ). Kant’s examples are likely to have offended Forster as
well, who considered himself aligned with Herder both in friendship and
intellectual orientation.
Kant’s ‘Determination of the Concept of a Human Race’ of November
 and his ‘Conjectural Beginning of Human History’ (also published
in the Berlinischen Monatsschrift in January ) provoked Georg
Forster to write a scathing reply titled ‘Something More on the
Human Races’. Georg Forster had sailed around the globe with James
Cook and was considered one of Germany’s most important world trav-
ellers, along with his father and Alexander von Humboldt. The young
Forster combined his annoyance over the criticism of travellers with a
defence of the Linnéan method as a proven tool of making precise obser-
vations (Forster : ). Forster’s work is based on the theory of the
scala naturae, the ‘natural chain’ or ‘great chain of being’, according to
which everything proceeds gradually. The gap betweenman and ape thus
had to be filled – by an ape-like man. Forster may reject the concept of
race, but he does so only because he follows an alternative system of
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classification which likewise requires differences in order to then identify
classes and species based on similarities.
The core of the argument over skin colours is disagreement on the ‘black
race’. Forster takes the side of the polygenists when he accepts the
assumption that there were multiple original human species (Forster
: ). He takes up the concern that this assumption of different spe-
cies of blacks and whites may support the European feeling of superiority
by asking, in turn, whether ‘the idea, that black people are our brothers,
had anywhere, at any time, moved the slave driver to lower his whip’ (,
translation mine). The proof of a common origin was powerless against
the practice of slavery. The lack of sympathy was responsible for the des-
potic rule of white subjects and for slavery (ibid.). In contrast, Forster
thinks that the idea of a second human species may be a ‘forceful means
to develop thoughts and sentiments suitable to a reasonable earthly crea-
ture (, translation mine). Forster condemns contemporary colonial-
ism and demands reforms – but in a way which would put the ‘white’ in
the place of a ‘father’ of the ‘black race’ to ‘ennoble’ it (ibid., transla-
tion mine).
Once again, the critique of colonialism appears as the reform of coloni-
alism. Unlike today’s readers, Forster does not question Kant’s criticism
of colonialism and the treatment of black people, but he does not believe
that Kant’s theoretical reasoning – based on the monogenetic thesis of a
common origin of humankind – can play a useful role in explaining the
necessity of reform. In contrast, Forster hopes for an educational effect of
the assumption of the different human species – an expectationKant finds
(presumably in accordance with today’s readers) implausible.
Kant responds to Forster’s harsh criticism with ‘On the Use of
Teleological Principles in Philosophy’ (), an extensive and concili-
atory response that is mild in tone and dedicated to finding common
ground, but which nonetheless strictly maintains his position.
Teleological principles determine the ‘natural end’ or ‘natural purpose’
(Naturzweck) a priori through purely practical reason. They could ‘estab-
lish a principle in advance which is supposed to guide the investigator of
nature even in searching and observing’, while its absence limited the
investigation to ‘mere empirical groping’ (UTP, : ). Kant again
stressed the importance of this proposition for the discussion of the origin
of the ‘black race’: to follow Linné in looking for similarities carries the
risk of overlooking the proof for the common origin of humankind. That
risk showed clearly ‘that one must be guided by a determinate principle
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merely in order to observe, i.e., to pay attention to that which could indi-
cate the phyletic origin, not just the resemblance of characters’ ().
Kant thus retains his distinction between the observation of nature and
natural history. The latter
would only consist of tracing back, as far as the analogy permits,
the connection between certain present-day conditions of the
things in nature and their causes in earlier times according to
laws of efficient causality, which we do not make up but derive
from the powers of nature as it presents itself to us. (UTP, : )
This is why Kant continues to use the term ‘race’, understood as a ‘con-
cept’ that cannot be rejected simply because it was not part of Linné’s
system; to do so would be to deny the thing itself (UTP, : ). Rather,
‘race’ was a concept from natural history, where it served as one of the
categories alongside phyla and ‘human sorts’. At issue, then, was ‘an
idea of the way in which the greatest degree of manifoldness in the gen-
eration can be united by reason with the greatest unity of phyletic
origin’ (). Kant emphasizes the distinction between differences
between ‘races’ and differences between species (). The object
of investigation may be differences, but those must not be exaggerated
through predetermined classifications, in order to maintain the
‘common origin’.
At its moment of origin, all members of the human species carried within
themselves the germs of all possible characteristics and subsequently
developed them according to their climatic surroundings. A second phase
of adaptation could be described as inertia based on this development:
once ‘races’ had adapted to a certain climate, they tended to stay there,
which explained the lack of northbound migration by Indian and ‘black’
peoples. Where individual peoples had defied that trend, the results were
not encouraging. Kant attempts to illustrate this by the example of the
‘gypsies’ who ‘have never been able to bring about in their progeny
: : : a sort that would be fit for farmers or manual labourers’ (UTP, :
). In a footnote, he takes this example further by way of referencing
a report on freed ‘Negro slaves’ who never ‘engaged in a business which
one could properly call labor’ and instead chose casual employment and
ultimately became ‘hawkers’ (n.) Kant infers from this that there
existed an independent ‘drive to activity’ he called industry (Emsigkeit)
and which is
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especially interwoven with certain natural predispositions; and
that Indians as well as Negroes do not bring any more of this
impetus into other climates and pass it on to their offspring than
was needed for their preservation in their old motherland and
had been received from nature; and that this inner predisposition
extinguishes just as little as the externally visible one. The far
lesser needs in those countries and the little effort it takes to pro-
cure only them demand no greater predispositions to activity.
(UTP, : n.)
This passage from a footnote in ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in
Philosophy’ and its citation of the writings of an anti-abolitionist author
is commonly read as a fusion of ‘racist’ and moralistic characterizations.
According to this interpretation, Kant here confirms his belief in the
‘natural inferiority of non-whites’ (Kleingeld : ).
A different aspect of Kant’s interest emerges when we extend the scope to
include the discussion of the development out of the (pre-state) state of
nature. Kant, who has described the state of nature as a state of misery,
now accepts the idea of a simple life in hot climates which required ‘little
effort’ and interprets the lesser ‘drive to activity’ as adaptation to the
abundance found in hotter regions. Furthermore, the same adaptation
now became visible among Americans who migrated from the South
northwards across the headland to America and back toward the
South without the opportunity to completely adapt.
That their natural disposition did not achieve a perfect suitability
for any climate, can be seen from the circumstance that hardly
another reason can be given for why this race, which is too weak
for hard labor, too indifferent for industry and incapable for any
culture – although there is enough of it as example and encour-
agement nearby – ranks still far below even the Negro, who
stands on the lowest of all the other steps that we have named
as differences of the races. (TPP, : –)
Kant clearly articulates strongly negative evaluations here. But the ‘racial
difference’ he is referencing is just ‘predisposition to activity’. In other
words, Kant takes the supposedly weaker drive to activity among
Americans and Africans to be a racial difference. He does not describe
a case of cultural or moral failure but a logical and naturally caused case
of adaptation to given conditions – an adaptation that loses its validity in
different contexts and then appears as indolence. Kant avoids the
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evaluative word ‘laziness’ that he had used previously. He supports his
argument by referring to the anti-abolitionist James Tobin who had
reported that freed black slaves never chose farming as their vocation.
The emphasis here should not be read as lying on work as such, but
on the description of agriculture as a ‘capacity’ required to prepare the
advance of a society into state-ness. Kant wants to know whether freed
slaves take up farming, and if they do not, then their choice proves their
original adaption to climatic conditions in the Southwhich rendered agri-
culture unnecessary and thereby prevented differentiation to the degree
that it was seen in Europe. The issue of agriculture was crucial in the
Scottish Enlightenment’s discussion of humanity’s stages as hunters
and gatherers, herdsmen and farmers, as well as in Montesquieu’s work
(cf. Meek ), and its treatment by Kant is the crucial point of the cited
passage – and not his position on the question of slavery. To Kant,
Americans are ‘idle’ because that is part of their adaptation – there is
no point in condemning it, as it can explained as part of the natural
history of humans.
The level of explanation is that of ‘race’ – a biological level based on the
assumption of prehistorical imprint. The identification of idleness
confirms Rousseau’s dictum of the ‘savage’ who, when his hunger is sat-
isfied, lives in peace with all of nature and is everybody’s friend. To read
Kant’s statement negatively, as a pejorative description in the sense of
‘laziness’ means to remain stuck in the categories of a ‘work society’
which, according to Rousseau is the direct opposite to this way of life.
For Kant, idleness (a description) is not laziness (amoral evaluation) but a
form of natural adaptation which follows necessities. Idleness is a natural
trait. It cannot be condemned, but it can in Kant’s view be observed and
noted. His search for evidence for this thesis led him to Tobin, but his
acceptance of Tobin’s observation does not translate into an affirmation
of his position on slavery.
Kant does speak of ‘steps’ and ‘the lowest of all steps’, and of being ‘inca-
pable of any culture’. The standard used here is, of course, European cul-
ture, but also Japan, Persia or China. These ‘cultures’ are marked by
social institutions and habits similar to Europe’s, that is, those that
primarily stand in for state-ness.
Kant intended to recognize the unity of the human species as biological
creatures and needed to explain its differences in the process. To do so, he
developed the concept of race, determined by the hereditary characteristic
of skin colour. He works with ‘observable’ differences: industry resulted
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in a higher position in the global hierarchy and industry seems to be
attached to ‘races’ determined by skin colour. Kant’s explanation of these
differences does not mean affirmation: to him, the lack of highly devel-
oped public order, organization and technology suggests the supposed
lack of an urge to activity, which in turn is understood as a consequence
of the different processes of adaptation to climatic conditions undergone
by the different ‘races’.
6. Conclusion
Kant’s concept of race undergoes a transformation. It begins with the
climate-theoretic categorization of extremes and a hierarchy of the ori-
gins of different races, moves on to a non-hierarchical concept of race,
and ultimately arrives at a notion that identifies activity teleologically
as a characteristic and uses it to confirm power relations and differences
in the political world. As problematic as the third and final version may
be, it does not amount to an affirmation of those relations.
The final stage serves as the new point of departure for Kant’s thought as
he realizes the globalization of the violent potential of European, ‘barbar-
ian’, states. Accordingly – and thematically fitting with his writings
on race, albeit without using the term ‘race’ – Kant writes in the Physical
Geography: ‘The inhabitant of the temperate zone, especially in its cen-
tral part, is more beautiful in body, harder working, more witty, more
moderate in his passions, andmore sensible than any other kind of people
in the world. Consequently, these people have always taught the rest [of
the world] and vanquished them by the use of weapons’ (PG, : ).
The point of this article is not to deny that Kant expressed prejudices
against non-Europeans. He did, without a doubt, repeatedly and more
or less uncritically. The point is also not to argue for any concept of ‘race’.
The point has been to show that Kant’s use of the concept of ‘race’ is con-
sistent with his anti-colonial legal theory. Kant underwent a gradual
change of opinion concerning non-European peoples that can also
be identified in his essays on race and is consistent with his late anti-
colonialism. One problem that could not be covered up here is his con-
tribution to theorizing a type of superiority based on the image of the state
of nature in the theory of the state: Kant follows Hobbes in equating
it with the ‘lawless condition’ of the ‘savage’ and thus comes to be
convinced of the inferiority of non-state forms of social life vis-à-vis
state-building ones.
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Traditionally, we have taken Kant’s change of heart to consist in having
given up his racist views (views on racial hierarchy) and embracing egali-
tarian global law and anti-colonialism in his late writings. This article has
shown that Kant’s change of heart lay in moving from uncritical repeti-
tion of European prejudices to a non-racist theory of race in  that is
determined to reject the assumptions of different human species. His anti-
colonialism and the development of his race theory can be understood as
consistently motivated and not distinguished by racist motives for the
race theory and anti-colonial intentions for the legal theory. In his engage-
ment with travel reports and the prejudices against non-European
peoples that have their foundation in the barbarism discourse, Kant
increasingly enlightened his own judgements to the point where he no
longer trusted those reports at all and instead relied on a biological deter-
mination of ‘races’.
The racial hierarchy contained in his concept of race corresponds to the
colonial reality of a world currently reordered through European expan-
sion without affirming it. Kant was aware that the reason for the success
of European expansion was rooted in state-based organization, a positive
work ethic and technological advantage. He does not condemn this devel-
opment in his writings on race but investigates the reason for those
differences. He finds them in the Europeans’ industry and the ‘idleness’
(Trägheit) of Africans, understood in both cases as a race’s adaptation
to climatic condition that can no longer be changed.
Kant does not seek to ground moral judgements in his writings on race.
Conversely, the moral evaluation of European expansion can be found in
Perpetual Peace andTheMetaphysics of Morals. The anti-colonial thrust
of these writings is not inconsistent with the writings on race but provides
a loose unity. But if such a consistency between Kant’s writings on rights
and those on race is possible, it also changes our interpretation of his
position on colonialism. Kant did not start condemning colonialism only
with his essay on peace but had criticized its conceptual foundations
much earlier. Anti-colonialism is a feature of his writings on race as well
as his legal theory.
Notes
 See Kleingeld : , Bernasconi :  and , Kleingeld : , Mills
: , McCarthy : .
 Similarly, Muthu (: ) argues that the term race ‘disappears’ from his published
writings after , suggesting a change of mind on the issue.
 See also Flikschuh and Ypi , Williams , Muthu : –, Kleingeld
, Eberl and Niesen .
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 Pauline Kleingeld holds that Kant maintained his old opinions until : ‘By the middle
of the s, however, he has radically changed his mind on the subject of race. He starts
to criticize slavery, the slave trade, and colonialism, explicitly attributing full juridical
status to non-whites under the new category of “cosmopolitan right”, changing his
description of the characteristics of the races, and regarding continued global migration
and trade as part of the plan of nature’ (Kleingeld : ).
 See Borst : –, Nippel , Detel , Münkler , Wallerstein ,
Osterhammel , Boletsi , Rawson , Todorov , Pagden .
 McCarthy has written about the dichotomy of ‘barbaric’–‘civilized’, but understands it
as a pattern that essentially belongs to the nineteenth century (cf. : ).
 Reinhard Koselleck () provides a vivid description of the asymmetrical structure of
the concept of the ‘barbarian’. At the same time, however, his Schmittian approach sug-
gests that all subsequent terms of discrimination, including the Nazi era concept of the
‘subhuman’ (Untermensch), should be understood as mere successors of the ‘barbarism’
discourse. As a consequence, the concept of ‘subhuman’ has its specific connotation (and
intention) of genocidal extermination. Following Koselleck, Annette Barkhaus ()
reads Kant as ‘translating’ the barbarism discourse into a race discourse.
 This distinction between the human history as an animal and the idea of its rights is also
stressed in today’s accounts of the history of humankind, see for example Harari (:
).
 Whenever possible and unless otherwise noted, I use the translations provided by the
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, with the standard Akademie pag-
ination (as carried in themargins of that edition), and the following abbreviations.MM=
Metaphysics ofMorals, PP= Perpetual Peace (in Kant );CJ=Critique of the Power
of Judgement (Kant ); DCR = ‘Determination of the Concept of a Human Race’,
IUH= ‘Idea for aUniversal historywith aCosmopolitan Intent’,OBS=Observations on
the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, ODR = ‘Of the Different Races of Human
Beings’, RH = Review of J. G. Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of
Humanity. Parts  and ; UTP = ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in
Philosophy’ (in Kant ); APG =‘Plan and announcement of a series of lectures on
physical geography with an appendix containing a brief consideration of the question:
Whether theWest winds in our regions aremoist because they travel over a great sea’,PG
= Physical Geography (in Kant ); DR =Drafts for Perpetual Peace (in Kant );
and RA = Reflections on Anthropology.
 On this topic, see the majority of the contributions in Elden and Mendieta .
 ‘I have used all sources, sought out all information, and, in addition to what the works of
Varenius, Buffon, and Lulof contain in the way of the general fundaments of physical
geography, I have gone through the most thorough descriptions of individual countries
by capable travellers, the Allgemeine Historie der Reisen, the Göttingische Sammlung
neuer und merkwürdiger Reisen, the Hamburg and the Leipzig Magazines, the
Proceedings of the Acedémie des Sciences in Paris and the Stockholm Academy and
so forth, and I have constructed a system out of everything relevant to my purpose.’
(APG, : ).
 ‘Homo americanus: red, choleric, erect; hair black, straight, thick; nostrils wide; face
harsh; beard scanty, obstinate, content, free; paints himself with fine red lines; regulated
by customs
Homo europaeus: white, sanguine, muscular; hair yellow, long; eyes blue; gentle
acute, inventive; covered with close vestments; governed by laws
Homo asiaticus: pale yellow, melancholy, inflexible; hair black; eyes dark; serious,
proud, avaricious; covered with loose garments; governed by opinions
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Homo afer: black, phlegmatic, relaxed; hair black, tangled; skin silky, nose flat, lips
tumid; crafty, indolent, negligent; anoints himself with grease; governed by caprice.’
(In Jablonski : )
 Arthur Ripstein also stresses Kant’s condemnation of war as ‘barbaric’. He takes ‘bar-
baric’ to be ‘a technical term for Kant’ (: ) and draws on Kant’s use of it in his
system of states in the Anthropology (: ). But Ripstein misses Kant’s criticism of the
older use of the term, and its interpretation as a ‘technical term’ describes his own posi-
tion more accurately than Kant’s. See also Bertram . Ripstein’s interpretation of the
‘violation of the postulate of public right’ as the ‘distinctive feature of barbarism’ (:
–) conflates barbarism in the end with the ‘state of nature’. This is clearly in Kant’s
sense and has inspired social theory and criticism through the last two hundred years, but
still it is a highly problematic use of a conceptual dichotomy that leads directly to the
distinction between democracies and the ‘unjust enemy’ as incarnation of the ‘barbarian
state’; see e.g. Bernstein .
 This, again, is in line with Harari’s account of the history of humankind, cf. : .
 Statements pointing in the opposite direction – certainly written much later – can be
found, for instance, in the Physical Geography: ‘Even in the case of the captain who
was captured as a youngNegro boy andwho became famous inHolland for his learning,
it is highly probable that it was his longing for his homeland that made him leave
Europe.’ (PG, : ).
 Similarly, Kant writes in his Physical Geography: ‘The friendship of these savages is
taken to extraordinary lengths.’ In the same passage, he also notes ‘the great inclination
of these people to independence’ (PG, : ).
 Voltaire published two essays on race, the first similar to Hume‘s essay, titled Essai sur
lesmœurs et l’esprit des nations (Essay on theManners and Spirit ofNations, first edition
) and La Philosophie de l’histoire (The Philosophy of History, first edition )
with the first chapter ‘Of theDifferent Races ofMan’. Already in Voltaire displayed
negrophobic ressentiments in his Traité de Métaphysique.
 Despite the resemblance to Linné’s evaluations, Koller argues that Kant’s are not moral
judgements of different ‘races’ (: ).
 On this debate, see Godel and Stiening .
 Forster’s choice of words strongly suggests a polygenistic approach, against Pauline
Kleingeld’s argument that explicitly rejects this reading, particularly of Forster’s late
writing (: ). See on Forster’s polygenism van Horn ().
 In Forster‘s words directed at the ‘white’: ‘Du solltest Vaterstelle an ihm vertreten, und
indem du den heiligen Funken der Vernunft in ihm entwickeltest, das Werk der
Veredlung vollbringen, was sonst nur ein Halbgott, wie du oft glaubtest, auf Erden
vermogte. Durch dich konnte, sollte er werden, was du bist, oder seyn kannst, ein
Wesen, das im Gebrauch aller in ihm gelegten Kräfte glücklich ist’ (Forster : ).
 Forster ultimately regretted the acerbity of his criticism of Kant, according to a letter sent
to Johann Benjamin Jachmann in the aftermath of the debate, in the fall of 
(Lepenies : ).
 Bernasconi (: ) has traced Kant’s reference to Tobin to Sprengel’s Beiträge zur
Völker und Landerkunde, vol.  () and joins Kleingeld in interpreting it as a sign of
Kant’s affirmation of Tobin’s anti-abolitionist position. (See the discussion that follows
in the main text.)
 Kant’s use of the two terms is not always consistent. In the Physical Geography hewrites:
‘The inhabitants of the hottest zone are exceptionally indolent. In some cases, this lazi-
ness is tempered to an extent by the government and by force : : : their indolence caused
them to choose to go hungry in the forests rather than work’ (: ).
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 This research received funding from the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation through
a Feodor-Lynen Fellowship that supported my research stay at Indiana University,
Bloomington, in . There, I greatly benefited from very helpful discussions with
my academic host, William E. Scheuerman, as well as with Allen Wood, Russ
Hanson and Volker Schmitz. Many thanks also go to the participants of the panel on
‘Kantian Political Theory and Global Change’ at the ECPR General Conference in
Hamburg, , and to the two anonymous reviewers. I am also grateful for a very help-
ful comment by Inés Valdez.
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